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THE ADOPTION OF ENGLISH LAW IN MARYLAND.
It is an interesting study to trace the development of law in
the colonies of England which developed into the United
States. That the colonists carried with them the rights of Eng-
lishmen, when they crossed the Atlantic, is one of the axioms
of our constitutional history. What portion of'the law of the
mother country they carried with them has been somewhat dis-
puted. The charter granted to Cecilius Calvert, Second Lord
Baltimore, gave the settlers especial privileges, among them the
right to preserve their English citizenship and to possess lands
and other property in England, as though still resident there.
They were also "frequently and peaceably to have and possess"
"all privileges, franchises and liberties of this our kingdom
of England," and to be permitted to use and enjoy them," in
the same manner as those still in England. The laws and ordi-
nances of the Province must be"agreeable to the laws, Statutes,
customs and rights" of England.
The colonists themselves stated their understanding of the
place of English Law in Maryland in the "Act for Rule of Judi-
cature," passed in 1646. The words of the Act have the true
ring, and we can feel sure that justice will be done by people
who decree thus. "Right and just in all civil causes shall be
determined according to the law or most General usage of the
Province since its plantacon or former presid'ts of the same or
the like nature to be determined by the Judge. And in defect
of such Law usage or president, then right and just shall be
determined according to equity and good conscience, not neg-
lecting, so far as the Judge or Judges shall be informed thereof,
and shall find no inconvenience in the application to this Prov-
ince the rules by which right and just useth and ought to be
determined in England in the same or the like cases. And all
crimes and offenses shall be judged and determined according
to the law of the Province, or in defect of certain Law, then
they may be determined according to the best discretion of the
Judge or Judges judging, as neer as conveniently may be to the
laudable law or usage of England in the same or the like
offenses. Provided that no person be adjudged of life member
or freehold without law certain of the Province." (Md. Archives
Assembly I, p. 147.)
The people of Maryland still claim in their State Constitu-
tion that they "are entitled to the common law of England, and
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
the trial by jury according to the course of that law, and to the
benefit of such English Statues as existed on the Fourth day of
July, r776; and which, by experience, have been found applica-
ble to their local and other circumstances, and have been intro-
duced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or Equity."
(Const. of x867. Declaration of Rts. Art. 5.) The Constitutions
adopted in 185i and in 1864 contain the same provision, but the
original Constitution of 1776 words it somewhat differently,
claiming: "That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to
the common law of England, and the trial by jury, according
to the course of the law, and to the benefit of such English
Statutes as existed at the time of their first emigration, and
which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local
and other circumstances, and of such others as have been since
made in England, or Great Britain, and have been introduced,
used and practiced by the courts of law or equity. (Dec. of
Rts. Art. 3.)
It will be noted that the "common law is adopted in mass,
so far at least, as it is not inconsistent with the principles" of
the Constitution and the "nature of our political institutions."
(Dashiell v. Atty. Gen., 5 H. and J. 401. This is the cause in
which it was decided that the Statutes of Charitable Uses was
not in force in Maryland.)
In regard to Statutes of England, the old Constitution made
two classes which were to be in force: Those which "existed
at the time" of the" first emigration, and which, by experience,
have been found applicable," and those made later and "intro-
duced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law and Equity."
These classes were merged into one by the Constitution of
1851, as we have seen, but they were held to be quite different
previous to that time. The Court of Appeals in 1822 held that
the Bill of Rights "musi be understood as adopting the differ-
ent classes of the Statutes to which it relates sub modo only, and
rejecting all others; and as laying down rules by which to ascer-
tain what Statutes were so adopted-a different rule applying
to each case. * * * As to the latter class, * * * none
are in force but such as had, at the time of the Declaration of
Rights, been introduced, used and practiced by the courts." A
"different language" was "adopted in relation to them from that
which was used in relation to the common law." The provis-
ion was not a "mere declaratory" one, but the framers declared
the "inhabitants of the State to be entitled" to the. benefit of
certain classes of Statutes, with "the intention to prohibit the
use of all such as had not by experience been- found applica-
ble." (Dashiell v. Atty. Gen., 5 H. and J. 402.)
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It will be seen that the State thus claims for the Courts of
Provincial Maryland a final decision as to the applicability of
English Statutes. This position should be compared with
Blackstone's well-known words on the colonies. To him there
were "many and very great restrictions" to the propositions
that "all the English laws then in being, which are the birth-
right of every subject, are immediately * * * in force in
an uninhabited country," "discovered and planted by English
subjects." "Such colonists carry with them only so much of
the English law as is applicable to their own situation and the
condition of an infant colony; such, for instance, as the general
rules of inheritance and of protection from personal injuries.
The artificial refinements and distinctions incident to the prop-
erty of a great and commercial people, the laws of police and
revenue, * * * the mode of maintenance for the established
clergy, the jurisdiction of spiritual courts, and a multit~te of
other provisions are neither necessary nor convenient for them,
and, therefore, are not in force. What shall be admitted and
what rejected, at what times, and under what restrictions, must,
in case of dispute, be decided in the first instance by their own
provincial judicature, subject to the revision and control of the
king in council; the whole of their Constitution being also
liable to be new modeled and reformed by the general superin-
tending power of the Legislature in the mother country."
(Commentaries I, io8.) This description would have been
accepted by the early Marylanders, even though Blackstone
himself might have been doubtful of its application to the
Province. Blackstone regarded most of the American colonies
as conquered countries, whither the common law and English
Statutes would not extend, but the Maryland Court of Appeals,
in 1821, took strong ground in opposition. In the opinion in
the leading case of the State vs. Buchanan (5 H. and J. 356), the
court said, "The Indians did not submit" to the colonists'
"government, but withdrew themselves from the territory they
acquired." The settlers "were, therefore, in the predicament
of a people discovering and planting an uninhabited country;
and as they brought with them all the rights and privileges of
Englishmen, they, consequently, brought with them also, as
their birthright, all the laws of England which were necessary
to the preservation and protection of those rights and privi-
leges." This common law is "nowhere to be found" in com-
plete form, but "the evidences of it" are discovered in judicial
decisions. The common law "in mass" was adopted by the
State Constitution, "as it existed here, either potentially or
3
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practically, and as it prevailed in England at the time, except
such portions of it as are inconsistent with the spirit of this
instrument, and the nature of our new political institutions."
A concurriftg opinion by the chief judge, the learned Jeremiah
T. Chase, stated the position of the State even more clearly
(5 H. and J. 366, 367). "The common law of England, as it was
understood at the time of the Declaration of Rights, was the
law of Maryland and * * * it must be ascertained by the
writing of learned men of the profession, by the judicial records,
and adjudged cases of the court of England * * * I con-
sider the adjudications of the courts of England, prior to the
era of the independence of America, as authority to show what
the common law of England was in the opinion of the judges
of the tribunals of that country, and since that time, to be
respected as the opinions of enlightened judges of the juris-
prudence of England." There was no question in regard to the
common law, as to whether it had ever been applied. The
courts of justice might punish conspiracy, according to that
law, although there had been no previous instance in Maryland
of a charge of conspiracy. They determined whether "any
particular parts of the common law are applicable to our local
circumstances and situation and our general code of laws and
jurisprudence." If the people did not like the judicial exposi-
tion of the common law, they could change that law through a
legislative act. Such judicial decisions, the Court of Appeals
said, whether made by English or Maryland courts, "must be
received as expositions of the law as it before existed and not
as creating a new law, or altering the old one." Nor are these
decisions "expansions of the common law, which is a system of
principles, not capable of expansion, but always existing, and
attaching to whatever particular matter or circumstances may
arise and come within this one or the other of them. * * *
Precedents, therefore, do not constitute the common law, but
serve only to illustrate principles."
Turning now from the common law to the Statutes of Eng-
land, we find that the test of use is given, in order to discover
whether they are in force. They must not only be applicable,
but must have been "found applicable" or have been "intro-
duced, used, and practiced in the courts." The General Court,
in 1802, assigned as one reason for a decision, that "the writ
of novel disseisin" should not be granted, that "the court know
of no instance in this State in which the tenant by elegit has
brought the writ of assize of novel disseisin to recover his pos-
session." "And it does not appear to the court there can be
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any other safe criterion by which the applicability" of "Eng-
lish Statutes which passed anterior to the first emigration of
the inhabitants of Maryland" to "our local and other circum-
stances can be ascertained and established, but that of having
been used and practiced under in this State." (Whittington vs.
Polk, x H. and J. 250.) This was the first Maryland decision in
which a Statute of the State was declared unconstitutional.
The same court, which was not the highest in the State, in
another decision rendered during the same year (Pancoast vs.
Addison, i H. and J. 356) held that the Statute of 32 Henry
VIII, ch. 2, § 2 (Kilty's Report, p. 74) does "not extend to the
State of Maryland, the court not knowing of any judicial
decision by which the same has been adopted and intro-
duced into this State as the law thereof." (The disputed
question was one of limitations.) This rule of the General
Court seems to have been held too narrow by the Court of
Appeals (Dashiell vs. Atty. Gen., 5 H. and J. 402) and the learned
McMahon disputes its validity, saying, "There were many
Statutes of such a character, that they might have been used
and practiced under in the Province without the intervention
of courts of justice; and such use would manifestly be a part
of the experience-of the colony. Judicial decisions are merely
the evidence of its experience." (History of Md., p. 129.)
He well distinguishes "the experience of the colony," con-
sisting of "use and practice generally," from "use and practice
in the courts." The former was the test of the applicability of
Statutes passed before the settlement of the Province, the latter,
that of the Statutes passed between 1632 and 1776. Kilty, in
his Report (p. VII) uses this distinction and criticises the Gen-
eral Court. He says: "It must be observed, that many Statutes
relating to rights and rules of property have been tacitly and
without contest acquiesced in, and that many have been used
and practiced under without the sanction of any express deci-
sion of the courts."
In addition to these two classes of British Statutes, there
were two other classes in force in Maryland, namely, those
which were "enacted expressly for the colonies or expressly
extended to them" and those which were expressly adopted by
the General Assembly (Kilty Report, p. VI, McMahon History,
p. 131). There was no difficulty, of course, as to which Statutes
were expressly introduced, but as to the two classes referred to
in the Bill of Right's, there was "considerable uncertainty." It
was felt that it was unfortunate "that the question as to
the applicability of English Statutes" should rest "upon the
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general tests of the Bill of Rights, without a full and definite
ascertainment of the Statutes falling within the operation '.f
those tests." (McMahon, p. 129.) As- a result, the General
Assembly at its Noveinber session, in 1794, passed a resolution
referring the question to the Chancellor, the Judges of the Gen-
eral Court, and the Attorney General, directing them to report
the several Statutes which fell within the two classes covered
by the provision in the Bill of Rights. (See Alexander's "Brit-
ish Statutes in Force in Maryland," p. VI.) Nothing was done
under this resolution, but a similar one passed at the November
session of 18o9 was to have greater effect. Then the Chancellor
and the Judges of the Court of Appeals were appointed a com-
mission to report to the General Assembly all such parts of the
English Statutes as were proper to be introduced and incorpo-
rated into the body of the Statute law of the State.
William Kilty, a most erudite jurist, was then Chancellor,
and the entire burden of the work fell on him. At the next
annual session of the Legislature he presented his report. For
some reason it was not adopted, and the only action taken by
the Assembly was that one thousand copies of the Report
should be printed. With remarkable labor and skill, Kilty had
searched the early judicial records of Maryland. His Report
contained far more than had been demanded of him. Not only
did he report the titles of the "Statutes and parts of Statutes
which have been found applicable and are proper to be incorpo-
rated into the body of the Statute Law of this State," but, "for
the purpose of enabling the Assembly to judge in the fullest
manner as to the correctness of these selections," he "added
lists of the Statutes which have not been found applicable to
the circumstances of the people, so as to comprise the whole of
the Statutes from Magna Charta to the i 3th George 3, in 1773."
(This boast was not fully carried out.) In most cases, he gave
a reason for his decision as to each Statute, and he carefully
excepted from the list of those "proper to be incorporated"
into Maryland law, those "which have been found appli-
cable, but are not proper to be introduced and incorporated
into the body of the Statute Law of this State." These were
mainly those Statutes whose existence depended on the con-
nection with Great Britain, or on a monarchical form of
government, or which were contrary to laws subsequently
passed by the General Assembly, or to the relation of the State
to the Federal Union. For these reasons we find that laws
against piracy, the testamentary law of England, the Habeas
Corpus Act, the Act of Succession, the Navigation Acts, and the
3?58
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Toleration Acts are included in this class. The changed con-
ditions of thought might also induce him to place acts in this
class, as when he said of 9 George 2, ch. 5, against witchcraft,
"This Statute is not necessary to be incorporated in the pres-
ent state of society and under our Constitution * * *; no
persons now being so absurd as to pretend to exercise such
witchcraft." In all, Kilty found one hundred and ninety-one
Statutes applicable and proper to be incorporated. The rule by
which he determined that a Statute had not been found appli-
cable was, undoubtedly, a rather vague one. For instance, he
said of 34 Ed. iii, ch. 8: "I have not found in the records of
the provincial court any case of a prosecution under this
Statute, or the others on the same subject, and as the offense is
punishable at common law, there was the less necessity for
their extension." Sometimes, as with reference to 2 Rich. 2,
Stat. i, ch. 51, Kilty seems to have thought the act had been
used occasionally in the Province, but still was not applicable.
Other Statutes had expired, were obsolete, were local, never
extended to the Province. Statutes which had been held appli-
cable in other colonies were not always thought by Kilty to
have been in force in Maryland. The famous provision of 3
Ed. x, Ch. 12, inflicting the peine forte et dure on prisoners
standing mute, was disregarded in Maryland, though accepted
in Massachusetts.
In order to save space, Kilty gave the heads of Statutes not
applicable to the Province from the year 136o, instead of sub-
mitting the full titles. From the year 1461, he omitted such
Statutes as were not contained in Cay's abridgment. The list
of Statutes found inapplicable closes with 176o.
The existence of Kilty's report and the habit of referring
to it by lawyers may have been one reason why the Constitu-
tion of i85i, changed the provision of the Bill of Rights and
consolidated the two classes of the old clause into one. The
preamble of the resolution of 1794 (Alexander British Stat-
utes, p VI) declared that "in a free government all legis-
lative acts, which respect the lives, liberties and estates of the
people ought to be published and a knowledge of them dif-
fused generally throughout the State." Though the text of the
Statutes "found applicable and proper to be incorporated" by
Kilty had not been separately published and though his work
was not adopted by the Legislature, it was "received and re-
spected" by the courts "as the repository" of English Stat-
utes in force in Maryland, and was regarded by them as almost
"an authoritative guide" (McMahon's History, p. 130). For
instance, the Court of Appeals said in an important case, "The
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only evidence" as to the applicability of early English Stat-
utes "is furnished by Kilty's Report." "That book was com-
piled, printed, and distributed, under the sanction of the State
for the use of its officers and is a safe guide in exploring an
otherwise very. dubious path." So the court declared the Stat-
ute of 43 Elizabeth concerning charitable uses not to be in
force in Maryland, largely because Kilty had said it was not
"found applicable" (Dashiell v. Atty. Gen., 5 H. and J. 403).
This case did not stand alone. In Koones v. Maddox (2 H. and
G. 107) the appellant's attorney was successful in winning his
suit, establishing the fact that the English Statute on which he
relied, obtained in the State, as it was classified by Kilty as
one "found applicable.'
The fact that Kilty did not regard a Statute as "applicable"
did not of course preclude a court from having a different view.
So the act of 4 and 5 William and Mary, ch. 24, was declared to be
in force by the Court of Appeals (Sibley v. Williams, 3 G. and J.
63), though Kilty thought otherwise. The court said: "So far
as regards that part of this Statute which relates to the sub-
ject under consideration, we apprehend the compiler was in
error." The court added "there can be little doubt but that
these Statutes (i. e., the one quoted and 30 Ch. ii, ch. 7) were in
force in this State. They concerned the administration of jus-
tice and it has always been understood that the judges under the
old government laid. it down as a general rule that all Statutes
for the administration of justice, whether made before or after
the charter, so far as they were applicable, should be adopted."
With regard to another Statute (9 and io William iii, ch. 15)
the Court of Appeals overruled Kilty's opinion, without even
referring to him (Shriver v. State, 9 G. and J. ii), and merely
spoke of "this Statute, which we hold was received and
adopted here," Kilty (Report p. i8i) had admitted that the
Statute had been used in provincial days (West v. Stigar, i H.
and McH. 247), but held that it was "not proper to be incorpo-
rated," as an act of the State Legislature had superseded it.
These seem to have been the only two instances in which
Kilty's opinion has been overruled. In reference to a third
Statute (i Rich. iii, ch. i), not found applicable by the Chan-
cellor, the Court of Appeals entertained certain doubts (Mat-
thews v. Ward, io G. and J. 4S5). The Statute whose adoption
-was claimed "was confined by its terms to uses. It may be
therefore doubted whether it applied to modern trusts and it is
questionable whether it is in force in the State." The court
does not seem to have pressed the question and the Statute has
been referred to in no other case. We find, therefore, that in
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only two cases, and these occurring in the first thirty years
after the publication of the Report, were additional Statutes
decided to have been found applicable, and that, in no case, was
one found applicable by Kilty taken out of the list by the
Court of Appeals.
In spite of the mass of new legislation, it was found that
frequent reference was necessary to the English Statutes in
force in the State, and in 1870, sixty years after Kilty's report,
Julian J. Alexander, Esq., of the Baltimore Bar, published "A
Collection of the British Statutes in force in Maryland, accord-
ing to the report thereof made to the General Assembly by the
late Chancellor Kilty, with notes and references to the Acts of
Assembly and the Code and to the principal English and Mary-
land cases." This stout octavo volume of 847 pages has its
purpose and accomplishment fully indicated in its title. It
contains a complete text of those provisions of English Stat-
ute law "found applicable and proper to be incorporated" by
Kilty, and to each Statute are appended erudite notes, often of
considerable length. The most extensive ones, those on the
Statute of Frauds, cover over forty-eight closely printed pages.
With the publication of Alexander's "British Statutes," our
story is ended. Though no official adoption of the book has
ever been made, it is fairly certain that within its covers is the
text of all the English Statute law in force in Maryland when
Kilty's Report was made.
We have touched on only one side of the subject. The long
and exciting struggle made by the colonists to secure the right
of the initiative in legislation for the provincial assembly in-
stead of for the proprietary, and to secure for themselves the
protection of the common law and the extension of English
Statutes, is a most interesting one. In that conflict with the
proprietary which lasted for a century, the provincials were
successful and obtained their aims. Another most useful chap-
ter in our subject is the one which should trace the method in
which the Provincial Court from the earliest days of proprie-
tary rule, applied the common law and Statutes of England.
We should see how the early acts "for Rule of Judicature"
were followed.
Such topics, however, are far too large to be -joined in one
brief article with the one we have discussed. We can see that
the Marylanders in.throwing off the allegiance owed to Great
Britain were following with consistency the course of the ear
liest settlers, when they cling to the "laudable law" of Eng-
land.
BERNARD C. STEINER.
